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CRIMINAL PROSECUTION AND THE MIGRATORY 
BIRD TREATY ACT: AN ANALYSIS OF THE 




American criminal law today has numerous goals, including the 
deterrence of anti-social conduct, rehabilitation, incapacitation, as well 
as the creation of a sense of security in society.1 Criminal laws, in their 
attempt to reach these goals, generally seek to punish only those who 
willfully offend the law2 by requiring proof of mens rea or a guilty 
mind.3 In fact, for various philosophical reasons, the defendant's moral 
culpability may be the most frequently cited justification for the crimi-
nallaw's severe sanctions.4 American criminal law has focused on the 
* Solicitations Editor, Articles Editor, 1996-1997, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AF-
FAIRS LAW REVIEW. 
1 See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 
401 (Summer 1958). 
2 See id. 
3 The term "mens rea" derives from the Latin maxim "actus not facit reum nisi mens sit rea 
(an act does not make one guilty unless his mind is guilty)." WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. 
SCOTI, JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 3.4, at 212 (2d ed. 1986). Frequently used synonyms of "mens rea" 
are "scienter" and "criminal intent." Susan F. Mandiberg, The Dilemma of Mental State in 
Federal Regulatory Crimes: The Environmental Example, 25 ENVTL. L. 1165, 1167 n.9 (1995). 
Although the maxim was important by the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the origin of 
the maxim is unknown. [d. "[Mjens rea is not a unitary concept, but may vary as to each element 
of a crime .... To determine the mental element required for conviction, each material element 
of the offense must be examined and the determination made what level of intent Congress 
intended the Government to prove .... " United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 613-14 (1971) 
(Brennan, J., concurring). 
4 Mark A. Cohen, Environmental Crime and Punishment: Legal/Economic Theory and 
Economic Evidence on Enforcement of Federal Environmental Statutes, 82 J. CRIM. L. & 
595 
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morally culpable since the founding era of the United States.5 English 
law, by the middle of the eighteenth century, also recognized that acts 
punishable as crimes generally required proof of mens rea or a guilty 
mind.6 William Blackstone declared that "to constitute a crime against 
human laws, there must be, first, a vicious will."7 Generally, when 
punishing criminal offenders, American common law has required the 
actor to have specific intent or knowledge of his or her actions and 
their consequences.8 
CRIMINOLOGY 1054, 1058 (1992). The criminal law generally describes harms that society desires 
to prohibit by threat of criminal punishment, and it invokes some of society's harshest penalties, 
including the loss of liberty, death, and often a life-long moral stigma attached to conviction. See 
SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES 
AND MATERIALS 204 (6th ed. 1995); Richard J. Lazarus, Meeting the Demands of Integration 
in the Evolution of Environmental Law: Reforming Environmental Criminal Law, 83 GEO. 
L.J. 2407, 2442--43 (1995). The power of government "to deprive an individual of liberty exists 
in uneasy tension with the ultimate importance that our system ... places on the dignity and 
individual worth of each person." Bruce R. Grace, Note, Ignorance of the Law as an Excuse, 86 
COLUM. L. REV. 1392, 1393 (1986). One commentator argues that mens rea is essential to the 
proper functioning of a criminal justice system. Hart, supra note 1, at 412. Henry M. Hart, 
argues that for criminal law to work: 
Id. 
(1) the primary addressee who is supposed to conform his conduct to the direction must 
know (a) of its existence, and (b) of its content in relevant respects; (2) he must know 
about the circumstances of the acts which make the abstract terms of the direction 
applicable in the particular instance; (3) he must be able to comply with it; and (4) he 
must be willing to do so. It seems inherently unfair to punish people for doing that 
which they did not know was wrong. 
5 This has not always been the case. Primitive English law "started from a basis bordering 
on absolute liability." Francis B. Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HARV. L. REV. 974, 977 (1932). People 
were held responsible for their acts that hurt others, regardless of their intent. Id. During the 
twelfth and thirteenth centuries, however, with a renewed interest in Roman law and an 
increased influence of ecclesiastical courts, mens rea grew in importance in English criminal law. 
Id. at 977, 982-84; see also M. Diane Barber, Fair Warning: The Deterioration of Scienter under 
Environmental Criminal Statutes, 26 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 105, 108 (1992). 
6 See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *21 (1765-69). 
7Id. "The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when inflicted by intention is 
no provincial or transient notion. It is as universal and persistent in mature systems of law as 
belief in freedom of the human will and a consequent ability and duty of the normal individual 
to choose between good and evil." Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952). Mens 
rea has traditionally existed when a free agent, "confronted with a choice between doing right 
and doing wrong, ... [chooses] freely to do wrong." Id. at 250 nA (quoting POUND, INTRODUC-
TION TO SAYRE, CASES ON CRIMINAL LAW (1927)). 
8 See Sidney M. Wolf, Finding an Environmental Felon under the Corporate Veil: The 
Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine and RCRA, 9 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1,24 (1993). 
The traditional definition of mens rea focused on the defendant's state of mind, purpose, and 
knowledge, as well as defendant's conduct, its results, and the reasons for the defendant's 
behavior. Lazarus, supra note 4, at 2443--44. Much confusion exists over the precise meaning of 
mens rea today because "not all lawyers and judges assign the term ... a normative meaning." 
Mandiberg, supra note 4, at 1167 n.lO. 
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The common-law requirement of mens rea, however, has not been 
absolute.9 In an attempt to maintain social control or a sense of secu-
rity in society, the criminal justice system has punished the morally 
blameless.1o Although the criminal law generally sought to punish only 
the morally blameworthy, the law, in a confusing and ill-defined para-
dox, also generally held that ignorance of the law was no excuse from 
criminal liability. 11 Traditionally, denying a mistake of law defense was 
justified for two reasons. First, courts did not always consider knowl-
edge of the law to be an element of the crimeP Second, the refusal to 
allow mistake of law as a defense was the consequence of a strong 
common-law presumption that every person knows the criminal law, 
that "the law is definite and knowable."13 
As regulatory statutes in the United States, such as environmental 
protection statutes, began to include criminal sanctions, courts faced 
the question of whether or not the common-law requirement of spe-
9 See Hart, supra note 1, at 40l. 
10 See Peter Arenella, Convicting the Morally Blameless: Reassessing the Relationship Be-
tween Legal and Moral Accountability, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1511, 1513 (1992). "Our criminal 
justice system need not and frequently does not make criminal liability dependent on some 
showing that the offender deserves moral blame for what he has done." [d. 
11 LAFAVE & SCOTI', supra note 4 § 5.1, at 406. "No area of the substantive criminal law has 
traditionally been surrounded by more confusion than that of ignorance or mistake of fact or 
law." [d. § 5.1, at 405. 
12 See MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 2.02 cmt. 11 (1985). 
The proper arena for the principle that ignorance or mistake of law does not afford an 
excuse is thus with respect to the particular law that sets forth the definition of the 
crime in question. It is knowledge of that law that is normally not a part of the crime, 
and it is ignorance of mistake as to that law that is denied defensive significance by 
... the traditional common law approach to the issue. 
[d. But see Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 n.4 (1952) (suggesting that a basic 
premise of the criminal law is that punishment is justified only where an individual actively 
chooses to do wrong). 
13 Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199 (1991); see also HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW *41 
(stating that law should correspond with actual feelings and demands of the community). The 
presumption was useful for two reasons: "first, without it a strong incentive not to know the 
law might be created; and second, proof of abstract, conceptual legal knowledge can be relatively 
difficult and, additionally, may be unnecessary where there is little likelihood that the defendant 
did not, in fact, know the law." Grace, supra note 4, at 1395-96 (footnote omitted). Today, 
commentators suggest that such a presumption is unrealistic, especially in the environmental 
law context. See Cheek, 498 U.S. at 199-200 (stating that the proliferation of statutes and 
regulations makes it difficult for the average citizen to understand the duties imposed by tax 
laws); see also Michael L. Travers, Mistake of Law in Mala Prohibita Crimes, 62 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1301, 1301-02 (1995) (stating that federal courts have recently shifted away from the 
position that mistake of law is never a defense); Kevin A. Gaynor et aI., Environmental 
Criminal Prosecutions: Simple Fixes for a Flawed System, 3 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 27 (1992) 
(suggesting that such a rule is not justified in the environmental law context where laws are 
more complex than tax laws and not generally understood by common citizens). 
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cific intent was a constitutionally protected requirement.14 While the 
Constitution does not explicitly require mens rea as an element of a 
criminal offense, the Due Process Clause may limit legislative power 
to dispense with mens rea. Generally, legislatures have the power to 
define criminal acts without regard to the intent of an actor.15 The 
United States Supreme Court has allowed legislatures to remove 
scienter requirements, creating strict liability in public welfare regu-
lations.16 Of course, this power cannot encroach upon constitutionally 
protected rights,17 and the Supreme Court has indicated that there 
may exist situations where legislatures may not completely remove 
mens rea without violating due process.18 
This Comment deals specifically with the constitutional status of 
specific intent in the context of environmental regulation. Federal 
circuit courts have treated environmental regulations as public wel-
fare offenses, seriously eroding the traditional criminal law notion of 
mens rea.19 Environmental crimes, however, differ from public welfare 
offenses in that they do impose a scienter requirement.2o In fact, most 
14 The question was whether mens rea had a constitutional status similar to the requirement 
of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (stating 
Constitution requires that prosecution prove beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the 
crime). 
15 United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 251-52 (1922) (stating that common-law requirement 
of mens rea not necessary where purpose of statute would be obstructed). 
16 See, e.g., United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 285 (1943); Balint, 258 U.S. at 252. 
17 See Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 155 (1959). 
18 See United States v. International Minerals & Chern. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 564 (1971); 
Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 228 (1957). 
19 See generally Ruth Ann Weidel et aI., The Erosion of Mens Rea in Environmental Crimi-
nal Prosecutions, 21 SETON HALL L. REV. 1100, 1100 (1991) (arguing that "the traditional 
common law definitions of mens rea, such as 'willfully,' 'purposely and' 'knowingly' have been 
significantly eroded by environmental enforcement statutes"). 
20 The Department of Justice focuses on prosecution of five federal statutes: The Clean Water 
Act, Clean Air Act, Toxic Substances Control Act, Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 
the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act, and the Federal 
Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act. Wolf, supra note 8, at 11 n.61. Numerous provisions 
in these statutes contain scienter requirements. See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2) 
(1994) (applying criminal penalties to anyone who "knowingly" violates particular source stand-
ards or permit limitations); 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(4) (applying criminal penalties to anyone who 
"knowingly" makes false statements or reports); 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(3) (applying criminal pen-
alties to anyone who "knowingly" endangers another through a violation); The Clean Air Act, 
42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(1) (1994) (applying criminal penalties to anyone who "knowingly" violates 
regulatory standards); 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(3) (applying criminal penalties to anyone who "know-
ingly" makes false statements or reports or tampers with a monitoring device); The Toxic 
Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2615(b) (1994) (applying criminal penalties to anyone who 
"knowingly" violates provisions of Act); The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide 
Act, 7 U.S.C. § 1361(b) (1994) (applying criminal penalties to anyone who "knowingly" violates 
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federal environmental statutes require that a defendant "knowingly" 
violate the law.21 Arguably, the more a regulation approximates a 
public welfare regulation, the stronger is the argument that mens rea 
is not required. Nevertheless, this Comment argues that, even for 
regulations which do not criminalize traditional public welfare of-
fenses, legislatures may dispense with specific intent without violat-
ing due process. This Comment charts the due process arguments 
associated with removing mens rea in environmental criminal law and 
the development of the public welfare offense doctrine, concluding 
that legislatures have expansive, almost absolute, power to eliminate 
mens rea from environmental criminal statutes. The Comment first 
explores the theoretical underpinnings of due process protections 
involving criminal statutes. The Comment then examines the reason-
ing underlying the public welfare offense doctrine and outlines a 
series of Supreme Court cases which define the doctrine. Lastly, the 
Comment analyzes the Migratory Bird Treaty Act's (MBTA) criminal 
penalties22 in an effort to reveal that legislatures may dispense with 
traditional mens rea notions of criminal intent without violating due 
process in most if not all environmental crimes. 
II. A BACKGROUND OF DUE PROCESS AND PUBLIC WELFARE 
OFFENSES 
A. Introduction to Due Process and Mens Rea 
The Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution states: 
"N 0 person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process oflaw."23 Although the United States Supreme Court has 
never precisely defined these words,24 the Court has stated, generally, 
that the Due Process Clause protects citizens from the arbitrary 
Act's regulations); Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 
(CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9603(b) (1994) (applying criminal penalties to anyone who "knowingly" 
fails to report a hazardous substance release); 42 U.S.C. § 9603(d)(2) (applying criminal penalties 
to anyone who "knowingly" destroys, falsifies or makes unavailable records required to be 
maintained); 42 U.S.C. § 9612(b)(I) (1994) (applying criminal penalties to anyone who "know-
ingly" submits false claims for CERCLA response costs); Resource Conservation and Recovery 
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d) (1994) (applying criminal penalties to anyone who "knowingly" trans-
ports, stores, or treats various hazardous wastes). 
21 Gaynor, supra note 13, at 11-12. 
22 Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA), 16 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2) (1994). 
23 U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fourteenth Amendment applies the same standard to state 
governments. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
24 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 807 (2d ed. 1979). 
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exercise of governmental power.25 In its broadest sense due process 
means: "that every citizen shall hold his life, liberty, property, and 
immunities under the protection of the general rules which govern 
society."26 
The Due Process Clause itself places no precise limit on a legisla-
ture's ability to dispense with mens rea in defining criminal acts.27 The 
United States Supreme Court, which "has never articulated a general 
constitutional doctrine of mens rea,"28 has stated that legislatures have 
expansive powers to declare an act criminal irrespective of scienter,29 
suggesting, in at least one case, that there exists no judicial power to 
require the inclusion of elements of knowledge.30 In the 1996 case of 
Montana v. Egelhoff, the Supreme Court, quoting language from 
Powell v. Texas, reiterated: 
The doctrines of actus reus, mens rea, insanity, mistake, justifica-
tion, and duress have historically provided the tools for a con-
stantly shifting adjustment of the tension between the evolving 
aims of the criminal law and changing religious, moral, philosophi-
cal, and medical views of the nature of man. This process of 
adjustment has always been thought to be the province of the 
states.31 
According to the Supreme Court, however, the Constitution does 
not empower legislatures to dispense with specific intent whenever 
and however they choose.32 The Due Process Clause contains basically 
four requirements for criminal statutes.33 Due process: (1) prohibits 
25 Minder v. Georgia, 183 U.S. 559, 562 (1902). 
26 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 808. 
27 See U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
28 Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 535 (1968) (plurality opinion). 
29 See Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 445-46 (1992) (stating that Court should not construe 
Constitution lightly to intrude on state administration of justice); Lambert v. California, 355 
U.S. 225, 228 (1957) (stating that "[t]here is wide latitude in the lawmakers to declare an offense 
and to exclude elements of knowledge and diligence from its definition"); Chicago, Burlington 
& Quincy Ry. Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 559, 578 (1911) (stating that "[t]he power of the 
legislature to declare an offense, and to exclude the elements of knowledge and due diligence 
from any inquiry as to its commission, cannot, we think, be questioned"). 
30 Chicago, Burlington & Quincy, 220 U.S. at 578; see also McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 
479, 485--86 (1986) (stating that crime prevention is business of states). 
31 Montana v. Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. 2013, 2023-24 (1996) (quoting Powell, 392 U.S. at 535-36). 
32 Lambert, 355 U.S. at 228. Cf Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (stating that 
states' policy judgments in criminal law will generally not be second-guessed under due process 
standards unless they offend "the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty"). 
33 See Stepniewski v. Gagnon, 732 F.2d 567, 571 (7th Cir. 1984). The due process standard is 
basically one of fundamental fairness and rationality. See Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 640-43 
(1991). The Supreme Court often looks to common-law history and the practices of various 
jurisdictions as concrete indicators of what fundamental fairness and rationality require. [d. The 
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statutes from shifting burdens of proof onto defendants;34 (2) prohibits 
the punishment of wholly passive conduct;35 (3) protects against vague 
and overbroad statutes;36 and (4) requires that statutes give fair warn-
ing of prohibited conduct.37 "The due process clause imposes little 
other restraint on the state's power to define criminal acts."38 In the 
area of mens rea, due process would therefore require that penal 
statutes give citizens fair warning or notice of which actions the law 
prohibits.39 "Fair warning" has no precise definition; rather, as an 
analysis of Supreme Court caselaw will demonstrate, "fair warning" 
exists along a continuum.4o For example, fair warning does not exist 
where a statute prohibits totally passive conduct.41 Furthermore, the 
more common or mundane the action or regulated item is, the more 
likely due process will require knowledge of the law.42 Conversely, 
where a statute regulates materials or conduct which are obviously 
dangerous, people may be presumed to be warned of the regulation.43 
Essentially, the more a regulation prohibits what an average citizen 
would consider wholly innocent behavior, the more likely a legislature 
must require knowledge of the law as element of the crime. 
B. The Development of the Public Welfare Offense 
The United States Supreme Court has stated clearly that certain 
public welfare regulations may dispense with mens rea without vio-
Court has noted that this is not a helpful yardstick with modern statutory offenses lacking 
common-law roots. [d. at n.7. 
34 See, e.g., Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 702 (1975). 
35 See, e.g., Lambert, 355 U.S. at 228-29. 
36 See, e.g., Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 497 
(1982). 
37 See, e.g., Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 351 (1964). 
38 Stepniewski, 732 F.2d at 571. 
39 Lambert, 355 U.S. at 228 (stating that "[e]ngrained in our concept of due process is the 
requirement of notice"); cf Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423, 438 (1959) (stating that a "state may not 
issue commands to its citizens, under crinlinal sanctions, in language so vague and indefinite as 
to afford no fair warning"). The "void for vagueness" doctrine requires only that a criminal 
statute give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his or her conduct is prohibited by 
law. 16A AM. JUR. 2d Constitutional Law § 818 (2d ed. 1979). 
[d. 
Lack of precision in a criminal statute is not itself offensive to the requirement of due 
process; the Constitution does not require impossible standards, and all that is neces-
sary is that the language convey sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed 
conduct when measured by common understanding and practices .... 
40 See infra notes 117-40 and accompanying text. 
41 Lambert, 355 U.S. at 228. 
42 United States v. International Minerals & Chern. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 564 (1971). 
43 [d. at 565. 
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lating due process.44 The history of public welfare regulation and the 
Supreme Court's caselaw in this area demarcate a class of regulations 
which constitutionally do not require mens rea.45 Public welfare regu-
lations appeared in the United States during the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury.45 Beginning with a case in 1861, the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court held certain statutory regulations did not require mens 
rea, particularly those regulating the sale of liquor and adulterated 
milk.47 In the seminal case of Commonwealth v. Boynton, the defen-
dant was convicted of selling intoxicating liquor even though he did 
not know the libation was intoxicating.48 The Supreme Judicial Court 
upheld the conviction, stating that it was unnecessary to "allege or 
prove that the person charged with the offence knew the illegal 
character of his act."49 The court reasoned that "[i]f the defendant 
purposely sold the liquor, which was in fact intoxicating, he was bound 
at his peril to ascertain the nature of the article which he sold."50 
By the end of the nineteenth century punishing offenses regardless 
of criminal intent became widely recognized and established in other 
states. 51 Public welfare statutes, which generally did not impose se-
vere criminal sanctions such as imprisonment,52 were aimed at regu-
lating liquor sales, adulterated foods and drugs, criminal nuisances, 
and other areas deemed necessary to protect public health and safety. 53 
The erosion of traditional mens rea requirements in public welfare 
regulations corresponded with the growth of an increasingly complex 
and powerful society following the industrial revolution. 54 This new 
industrial society required regulations heightening the duties of those 
44 See, e.g., United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 285 (1943); United States v. Balint, 258 
U.S. 250, 252 (1922). 
45 See generally Sayre, supra note 5, at 56-70 (discussing development of public welfare 
regulation). 
46 [d. at 56. The first such case in the United States was probably a Connecticut case where 
a tavern keeper was convicted for selling liquor to a drunkard even though he did not know the 
buyer to be such. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 256 (1951) (citing Barnes v. State, 
19 Conn. 398 (1849)). 
47 See Commonwealth v. Waite, 93 Mass. 264, 265 (1865) (sale of milk); Commonwealth v. 
Nichols, 92 Mass. 199, 199-200 (1865) (sale of milk); Commonwealth v. Farren, 91 Mass. 489, 491 
(1864) (sale of milk); Commonwealth v. Boynton, 84 Mass. 160, 160 (1861) (sale of liquor). 
48 Boynton, 84 Mass. at 160. 
49 [d. 
60 [d.; see also Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota, 218 U.S. 57, 69-70 (1910) (Supreme Court 
recognizing that individuals act at their own peril and are estopped to plead ignorance of the 
law). 
51 See Sayre, supra note 5, at 66 n.43 for various state holdings. 
52 [d. at 72. 
63 See id. at 72-73. 
54 See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 253~0 (1951). 
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in control of particular industries, trades, and property affecting the 
public health and safety.55 Francis Sayre suggests that a diminished 
mens rea in public welfare offenses resulted from twentieth-century 
changes in the administration of criminal law: 
(1) the shift of emphasis from the protection of individual inter-
ests which marked nineteenth century criminal administration to 
the protection of public and social interests, and 
(2) the growing utilization of the criminal law machinery to 
enforce, not only the true crimes of the classic law, but also a new 
type of twentieth century regulatory measure involving no moral 
delinquency.56 
The United States Supreme Court has long permitted state and 
federal legislatures to treat defendants charged with public welfare 
offenses more harshly by removing mistake of law and fact as viable 
excuses.57 In the 1910 case of Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota the 
Supreme Court first held that public welfare statutes which were 
punishable as misdemeanors and which removed the mens rea re-
quirement did not violate due process.58 Various justifications war-
ranted eliminating the requirement of mens rea-specifically knowl-
edge of the law-where there was no moral delinquency but where 
issues of public health and safety were involved.59 First, regulatory 
offenses were regarded as offenses against the authority of the state, 
"for their occurrence impair[ed] the efficiency of controls deemed 
essential to the social order .... "60 This rationale focused not on the 
intent of the actor but on the result of his or her actions, because the 
actor was in the best position to prevent the harm "with no more care 
than society might reasonably expect."61 Second, dispensing with a 
mens rea requirement was justified because the penalties of welfare 
offenses were generally small, and the convictions did not gravely 
besmirch the offender's reputation.62 It is important to note that these 
55 [d. 
56 Sayre, supra note 5, at 67. 
57 Gaynor, supra note 13, at 12 (stating that departure from the traditional mens rea require-
ment in the environmental context flows from the public welfare offense doctrine and from a 
line of cases holding that ignorance of the law is no excuse). 
58 Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota, 218 U.S. 57, 62-63, 67-70 (1910). In Shevlin the defen-
dant corporation was convicted of violating a statute prohibiting the removal of timber from 
state lands without a permit. [d. at 62-63. 
59 See Sayre, supra note 5, at 67-70. 
60 Morissette, 342 U.S. at 256. 
61 See id. 
62 [d. at 256. Thus, public welfare offenses generally avoided felony sanctions. Sayre, supra 
note 5, at 72; see also Morissette, 342 U.S. at 260 (citing POLLOK & MAITLAND, HISTORY OF 
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are reasons to dispense with a common-law rule, and therefore should 
not be equated with constitutional limits on dispensing with criminal 
intent.63 
The United States Supreme Court followed this reasoning in United 
States v. Balint.64 Balint was convicted for unlawfully selling opium 
and coca leaves in violation of the Narcotic Act of 1914, which was 
silent on mens rea requirements.65 Balint argued that the indictment 
against him had failed to charge him with selling the "inhibited drugs, 
knowing them to be such" and thereby violated due process of law.66 
The Supreme Court rejected this argument,67 holding that a "State 
may in the maintenance of a public policy provide 'that he who shall 
do them shall do them at his peril and will not be heard to plead in 
defense good faith or ignorance.m68 Hence, with Shevlin and Balint 
the Supreme Court dispensed with traditional mens rea notions where 
certain activities threatened the greater public, creating strict liabil-
ity for defendants handling items that posed a public risk.69 More 
importantly, the Balint Court implied that eliminating criminal intent 
in public welfare offenses did not violate due process.70 
ENGLISH LAW, 465) ("[I]nfamy is that of a felony, which, says, Maitland, is ' ... as bad a word 
as you can give to man or thing."'). With respect to the stiffness of the penalties, Sayre states: 
if the offense be punishable by imprisonment, the individual interest of the defendant 
weighs too heavily to allow conviction without proof of a guilty mind. To subject 
defendants entirely free from moral blameworthiness to the possibility of prison sen-
tences is revolting to the community sense of justice; and no law which violates this 
fundamental instinct can long endure. Crimes punishable with prison sentences, there-
fore, ordinarily require proof of a guilty intent. 
Sayre, supra note 5, at 72. It is important to note that courts have not delineated a precise line 
defining small penalties or those which do not gravely besmirch the reputation of the offender. 
See Morissette, 342 U.S. at 260. 
63 See Morissette, 342 U.S. at 260 (indicating that no constitutional standard for mens rea 
exists). 
64 258 U.S. 250, 252, 254 (1922). 
65 [d. at 25l. 
66 [d. at 251-52. 
67 The Supreme Court noted that the general common law rule requiring scienter even where 
a statute was silent had been modified such that scienter was not a necessary element of crimes 
where the purpose of the statute would be obstructed by such a requirement. [d. at 251-52. 
68 [d. at 252 (quoting Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota, 218 U.S. 57, 69-70 (1910)). The Court 
upheld Balint's conviction, reasoning that the intent of Congress was to "require every person 
dealing in drugs to ascertain at his peril whether that which he sells comes within the inhibition 
of the statute, and if he sells the inhibited drug in ignorance of its character, to penalize him." 
[d. at 254. 
69 See United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 284 (1943). 
70 Balint, 258 U.S. at 251-52. 
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Following the decision in Balint the Supreme Court expanded leg-
islative power to dispense with mens rea, holding that new parties-
corporate officials-could be held liable for public welfare offenses 
absent a showing of criminal intent.71 In United States v. Dotterweich, 
the Supreme Court held that all persons who had "a responsible share 
in the furtherance of the transaction which the statute outlaws" could 
be found criminally liable, even if they were unaware of the specific 
facts that made their acts or omissions illegal. 72 More specifically, the 
Supreme Court held that Joseph Dotterweich, president of a corpo-
ration which purchased drugs from manufacturers and shipped them, 
repackaged under its own label, in interstate commerce,73 could be 
criminally liable for a public welfare offense although he was unaware 
of wrongdoing.74 
Dotterweich was convicted of shipping misbranded and adulterated 
drugs in violation of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 
1938.75 The Supreme Court upheld a jury's guilty verdict finding that 
Dotterweich's ignorance of his company's having placed misbranded 
drugs into commerce did not relieve him of liability.76 In so holding, 
the Court rejected the argument that only the corporation could be 
held liable, stating that "the only way in which a corporation can act 
is through the individuals who act on its behalf."77 The Court also 
noted: 
The prosecution to which Dotterweich was subjected is based on 
a now familiar type of legislation whereby penalties serve as 
effective means of regulation. Such legislation dispenses with the 
conventional requirement for criminal conduct-awareness of some 
wrongdoing. In the interest of the larger good it puts the burden 
of acting at hazard upon a person otherwise innocent but standing 
in responsible relation to a public danger.78 
The Supreme Court further reasoned that Dotterweich's misdemeanor 
conviction was proper because, in promulgating the Act, Congress 
71 See Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 284. 
72 [d. 
73 [d. at 278. 
74 [d. at 281, 285. 
75 [d. The FDCA prohibits "[t]he introduction or delivery for introduction into interstate 
commerce of any food, drug, device, or cosmetic that is adulterated or misbranded." 21 U.S.C. 
§ 331(a) (1994). At the time, it was a misdemeanor for "any person" to violate the Act. 21 U.S.C. 
§ 333(a) (1940), amended by 21 U.S.C. § 333(a) (1994). 
76 Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 278-81, 285. 
77 [d. at 281 
78 [d. at 280-81 (citing United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 251-52 (1921). 
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extended "the range of its control over illicit and noxious articles and 
stiffened the penalties for disobedience" to provide protection in areas 
where people could not protect themselves.79 Recognizing that crimi-
nal convictions imposed hardships on persons lacking consciousness 
of wrongdoing, the Court restricted this type of liability to those who 
have "a responsible share in the furtherance of the transaction which 
the statute outlaws .... "80 
In 1975 the Supreme Court, relying on Dotterweich, expanded the 
"responsible share" doctrine to hold that, under public welfare stat-
utes, corporate officials would be ultimately responsible for the ac-
tions of their subordinates.81 In United States v. Park, a chief execu-
tive officer, who was convicted of violating the Federal Food, Drug, 
and Cosmetic Act by storing food in a building accessible to rodents 
and exposing the food to contamination by rodents, appealed his 
conviction to the Supreme Court.82 The Supreme Court reviewed the 
lower court's instructions to the jury that an "individual is or could be 
liable under the statute, even if he did not consciously do wrong .... 
Though, he need not have personally participated in the situation, he 
must have had a responsible relationship to the issue."83 The Supreme 
Court upheld the conviction, stating that the government established 
a prima facie case when it introduced "evidence sufficient to warrant 
a finding . . . that the defendant had, by reason of his position in 
the corporation, responsibility and authority either to prevent ... or 
promptly to correct, the violation complained of, and that he failed to 
do SO."84 Although the Court recognized the harshness of such a hold-
ing, it reasoned that such a requirement was "no more stringent than 
the public had a right to expect of those who voluntarily assumed 
positions of authority in business enterprises whose services and 
products affect the health and well-being of the public that supports 
them."85 
79 [d. at 280. 
80 [d. at 284. 
81 United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 672-73 (1975). 
82 [d. at 660, 666. 
83 [d. at 665 n.9. 
84 [d. at 673-74. The Court emphasized that the jury did not "find guilt solely on the basis of 
[defendant's] position in the corporation." [d. at 674. It seems that the Supreme Court found 
that some level of blameworthiness could be inferred from the relationship. See Weidel, supra 
note 19, at 1104 (citing Park, 421 U.S. at 673). 
85 Park, 421 U.S. at 672. Although the Park decision does not explicitly discuss the constitu-
tionality of eliminating specific intent, the Court implied that criminal liability without conscious 
fraud is permissible where the duty imposed under the criminal statute is not objectively 
impossible. [d. at 673. If the Court was implying that fair warning exists in a criminal statute 
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In both Dotterweich and Park the Supreme Court consciously dis-
pensed with traditional mens rea requirements in the area of public 
welfare statutes.86 Although Shevlin, Balint, Dotterweich, and Park 
do not set specific constitutional standards in relation to when a 
legislature may dispense with mens rea, these cases implicitly indicate 
that due process is not violated by strict liability statutes which 
regulate products or services which affect the health and well-being 
of the public.87 Therefore, people who deal with products or services 
affecting public health and well being can be presumed to have fair 
warning or notice that their actions are regulated.88 
III. "KNOWING" REQUIREMENTS AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
REGULATIONS 
Environmental regulations, however, are not traditional public wel-
fare offenses because they contain scienter requirements which force 
the government to establish that a defendant "knowingly violates" 
the applicable environmental standard.89 In the case of environmental 
regulations courts must now determine whether a legislature may 
clearly dispense with a requirement that an actor have knowledge of 
the law without violating due process. The United States Supreme 
Court has not articulated precisely when eliminating mens rea in 
environmental statutes violates due process. A line of Supreme Court 
cases, however, indicates that legislatures may dispense with knowl-
edge of the law whenever they choose, provided they do not criminal-
ize what the average citizen would consider to be wholly innocent 
behavior, and in the case of laws regulating items which are not 
inherently dangerous, they articulate a clear intent to do SO.90 
where the duty it imposes is not objectively impossible, then the Court was suggesting that the 
fair warning requirement is met by a very low standard. See id. 
86 See id. at 665; United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 280-81 (1943). 
87 See, e.g., Park, 421 U.S. at 670-73; Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 280-81; United States v. Balint, 
258 U.S. 250, 252-53 (1922); Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota, 218 U.S. 57, 69-70 (1910); see 
also Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423 (1952) (stating that "state legisla-
tures have constitutional authority to experiment with new techniques; they are entitled to their 
own standard of public welfare"). 
88 See Park, 421 U.S. at 672-73; cf Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 351 (1964). 
89 See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text. The "knowing" violations of environmental 
crimes generally are not defined statutorily, and Congress "avoided addressing at all what it 
meant by the mens rea requirements it enacted." Lazarus, supra note 4, at 2454. Lazarus 
discusses the failure of Congress to appreciate the significance of mens rea requirements in 
environmental criminal law. See id. at 2454-66. 
90 See infra notes 75--123 and accompanying text. 
608 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 24:595 
The Supreme Court first approached the issue of eliminating crimi-
nal intent in a "knowing" requirement statute in Morissette v. United 
States.91 In Morissette v. United States, Morissette, a junk dealer, 
openly entered an Air Force practice bombing range and took spent 
bomb casings which he honestly believed had been abandoned.92 After 
flattening them out and selling them at a profit of eighty-four dollars,93 
he was indicted and convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 641, which made 
it a crime to "knowingly" convert government property.94 
The Supreme Court reversed Morissette's conviction, holding that 
the omission from the statute of "any mention of intent will not be 
construed as eliminating that element from the crimes denounced."95 
Distinguishing Morissette's crime from the public welfare offense 
crime in Balint, the Court noted that embezzlement and theft were 
recognized as crimes which historically required proof of criminal 
intent.96 The Court stated: 
[W]here Congress borrows terms of art in which are accumulated 
the legal tradition and meaning of centuries of practice, it presum-
ably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to 
each borrowed word in the body of learning from which it was 
taken and the meaning its use will convey to the judicial mind 
unless otherwise instructed.97 
The Court refused to dispense with the requirement of criminal intent 
because Morissette's crime was one which required mens rea at com-
mon law and Congress made no showing of intent to dispense with 
the requirement for this crime.98 The Court warned that "such a 
91 342 u.s. 246, 260-63, 270-71 (1951). 
92 [d. at 247-48. 
93 [d. 
94 [d.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 641 (1994). 
95 Morissette, 342 U.S. at 263. 
96 [d. at 260-61. The Court reaffirmed its holding in Balint, noting that the "conclusion ... in 
Balint . .. has our approval and adherence for the circumstances to which it was there applied." 
[d. The Court also noted that stealing, larceny, and its variants and equivalents were traditional 
common law offenses. [d. at 260-61 n.19 (citing common law examples of cases involving stealing, 
larceny, and variants). 
97 [d. at 263. 
98 See id. at 260-62. The Court noted, however, that crimes, such as the crime in Balint, new 
to general law may dispense with mens rea: 
Congressional silence as to mental elements in an Act merely adopting into federal 
statutory law a concept of crime already so well defined in common law and statutory 
interpretation by the states may warrant quite contrary inferences than the same 
silence in creating an offense new to general law, for whose definition the courts have 
no guidance .... 
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manifest impairment of the immunities of the individual should not be 
extended to common-law crimes on judicial initiative."99 
Six years later, in the 1957 case of Lambert v. California, the 
United States Supreme Court first established a minimum constitu-
tional requirement for criminal intent. lOo In Lambert, the Court struck 
down a regulatory statute which provided criminal penalties for con-
victed felons who remained in Los Angeles for a period of more than 
five days without registering. lOi In finding the regulation unconstitu-
tional the Court conceded that lawmakers had wide latitude in exclud-
ing elements of knowledge from the statutory definition.102 The Court, 
however, held that the law violated due process and fairness because 
it provided the defendant no opportunity "to avoid the consequences 
of the law or to defend any prosecution brought under it."103 The Court 
stated that "where a person did not know of the duty to register and 
where there was no proof of the probability of such knowledge, he 
may not be convicted consistently with due process."104 Hence, Lam-
bert established a guiding principle that wholly passive conduct can-
not be subject to criminal penalties unless the actor is aware of the 
law making the passive conduct criminal.105 
In both Morissette and Lambert the Supreme Court expressed 
concern with citizens having fair warning or notice of what actions 
carry criminal penalties.106 The Morissette decision implies that a leg-
islature could omit knowledge of the law in a common-law crime if it 
Id. at 262. The Court also expressed concern with avoiding the harsh results of dispensing with 
mens rea requirements for the mere sake of making conviction easier: 
The Government asks us by a feat of construction radically to change the weights and 
balances in the scales of justice. The purpose and obvious effect of doing away with 
the requirement of a guilty intent is to ease the prosecution's path to conviction, to 
strip the defendant of such benefit as he derived at common law from innocence of evil 
purpose, and to circumscribe the freedom heretofore allowed juries. 
Id. at 263. 
99 Id. at 263. Where knowing requirements in statutes have not been defined by a legislature, 
the Supreme Court has been reluctant to interpret the statutes as dispensing with knowledge 
of the law. See Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 426 (1985). 
100 Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 229--30 (1957). 
101 Id. at 226-27, 229--30. 
102 Id. at 228. 
103Id. at 229. Justice Frankfurter, in his dissent, noting that the law was "thick" with similar 
regulations, described the majority position as "an isolated deviation from the strong current 
of precedents-a derelict on the waters of law." Id. at 230, 232. 
104 Id. at 229--30. 
105 Lambert, 355 U.S. at 229--30. 
106 Id.; Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 262 (1951). 
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did so explicitly in the act.107 Hence, fair warning would exist for 
purposes of due process even if a common-law crime, which had 
traditionally required knowledge of the law, was codified by a legisla-
ture explicitly eliminating such requirement. lOS The Lambert court, 
however, indicated that fair warning did not exist where legislatures 
subjected wholly passive conduct to criminal penalties without crimi-
nal intent.109 In dicta, the Lambert Court also implied that due process 
might be violated, and thereby fair warning denied, by a law which 
punished conduct which society considered to be wholly innocent.llo 
The Supreme Court did not state specifically that a criminal statute 
regulating behavior which the average citizen would consider inno-
cent would violate due process until the 1970 case of United States v. 
International Minerals & Chemical COrp.111 In International Miner-
als the Supreme Court construed a federal statutory provision mak-
ing it a crime to "knowingly violate" a regulation applicable to ship-
pers of hazardous material.112 The defendant corporation was charged 
with shipping sulfuric and hydrofluosilicic acids in interstate com-
merce and knowingly failing to show on the shipping papers that the 
property was a corrosive liquid. ll3 The Court held that the regulation 
in question required knowledge of the facts which make the action a 
violation, but not proof of knowledge of the law,114 
The Court rejected the defendant's claim that in this case dimin-
ished mens rea violated due process, stating that "where, as here, 
107 Morissette, 342 U.S. at 262. Although the Morissette Court did not state how specific 
Congress needs to be, courts could require Congress to provide an increasingly clear articulation 
of its intent to eliminate criminal intent as the severity of criminal penalties grows. 
108 I d. at 263. 
109 Lambert, 355 U.S. at 229-30. 
l1°ld. at 229. The Supreme Court quoted Holmes who stated that "[a] law which punished 
conduct which would not be blameworthy in the average member of the community would be 
too severe for that community to bear." Id. (quoting HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW *50). 
111402 U.S. 558, 564 (1971). 
112Id. at 559 (citing Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, § 834(f), 62 Stat. 739 (repealed 1979)). 
113Id. 
114 See id. at 563. One commentator has argued that the Court in International Minerals 
essentially created a presumption that the accused was aware of the existence of a regulation. 
Barber, supra note 5, at 124. Barber suggests: 
Id. 
[T]hus, a public welfare statute in which the legislature inserted a knowledge element 
was held to require general intent. Public welfare statutes without a requirement of 
mens rea traditionally had been upheld on the basis that the nature of the goods was 
such that the actor must not presume regulation and ascertain the facts. The Court 
now suggested that this presumption of regulation carried forward in a public welfare 
statute, even where the legislature had inserted a mens rea element. 
1997] CRIMINAL PROSECUTION 611 
dangerous or deleterious devices or products or obnoxious waste 
materials are involved, the probability of regulation is so great that 
anyone who is aware that he is in possession of them or dealing with 
them must be presumed to be aware of the regulation."115 The Court 
recognized, however, that mens rea could be diminished so as to 
violate due process, stating that "substantial due process questions" 
would be raised if Congress did not require mens rea in the regulation 
of commonplace or harmless items such as "[p]encils, dental floss, 
[and] paper clips."116 
Beyond pencils, dental floss, and paper clips, the Supreme Court 
has not delineated other items which legislatures could not regulate 
without including a requirement of criminal intent. The Supreme 
Court, however, has indicated that legislatures do not need to explic-
itly eliminate criminal intent in statutes regulating inherently danger-
ous items such as acids117 and grenades.118 In the case of acid, the 
International Minerals Court said people dealing with acid were 
presumed to have knowledge of the law regulating its use.119 The 
Supreme Court came to a similar conclusion in United States v. Freed. l20 
In Freed the government charged a defendant with illegally possess-
ing hand grenades that were not properly registered under the N a-
tional Firearms Act.121 The Supreme Court upheld the statute which 
required "no specific intent or knowledge that the hand grenades 
were unregistered."122 The Court noted: 
The present case is in the category neither of Lambert nor Moris-
sette, but is closer to Dotterweich. This is a regulatory measure in 
the interest of the public safety, which may well be premised on 
the theory that one would hardly be surprised to learn that pos-
session of hand grenades is not an innocent act. They are highly 
115Id. at 565. 
116 See International Minerals, 402 U.S. at 564. 
117 I d. at 565. 
118 United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 607 (1970). 
119 [nternational Minerals, 402 U.S. at 565. 
120 Freed, 401 U.S. at 607. 
121Id. at 603-04, 609-10. 
122 [d. at 607. In his concurring opinion, Justice Brennan explained: 
[Tjo convict appellees of possession of unregistered hand grenades, the government 
had to prove three material elements: (1) that appellees possessed certain items; (2) 
that the items possessed were hand grenades; and (3) that the hand grenades were not 
registered .... [Wlhile the Court does hold that no intent at all need be proved in 
regard to one element of the offense-the unregistered status of the grenades-knowl-
edge must still be proved as to the other two elements. 
Id. at 612. 
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dangerous offensive weapons, no less dangerous than the narcot-
ics involved in United States v. Balint . ... 123 
The Supreme Court has distinguished grenades and acid from food 
stampsl24 and automatic firing guns,125 finding that food stamps and 
automatic firing guns are not in the same inherently dangerous class. 
In Liparota v. United States the defendant allegedly committed food 
stamp fraud by violating a statute that punished "whoever knowingly 
uses, transfers, acquires, alters, or possesses coupons ... in any man-
ner not authorized by [the statute] or the regulations."126 Neither the 
regulation nor its legislative history clearly dispensed with knowl-
edge of the law as an element of the crime.127 The Supreme Court also 
found that food stamp fraud, unlike the firearms statute in Freed, did 
not regulate inherently dangerous conduct that a reasonable person 
should know is subject to public regulation.l28 Although the Court 
refused to interpret the law as dispensing with a vicious will,129 it 
noted that its holding did not prevent Congress from removing such 
a requirement if it did so explicitly.130 
The Supreme Court placed automatic guns into the same class as 
food stamps in the 1994 Supreme Court decision Staples v. United 
States.131 In Staples the petitioner was charged with possession of an 
automatic machine gun in violation of the National Firearms Act.132 
The defendant testified that the rifle had never fired automatically 
while he possessed it and that he had been ignorant of any automatic 
firing capability.133 The Court refused to interpret the statute's silence 
123 [d. at 609 (footnote omitted) (citing United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 251 (1922)). 
124 Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 424-25 (1984). 
125 Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 606 (1994). 
126 Liparota, 471 U.S. at 420 & n.1 (citing 7 U.S.C. § 2024(b)(1) (1994)). 
127 [d. at 424-25. 
128 [d. at 433. 
129 [d. at 425-27. 
130 [d. at 430. The court stated: 
[d. 
Our point once again is not that Congress could not have chosen to enact a statute 
along these lines, for there are no doubt policy arguments on both sides of the question 
as to whether such a statute would have been desirable. Rather, we conclude that the 
policy underlying such a construction is neither so obvious nor so compelling that we 
must assume, in the absence of any discussion of this issue in the legislative history, 
that Congress did enact such a statute. 
131 Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 611-12 (1994). 
132 [d. at 602-03. 
133 [d. at 603. 
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on mens rea as dispensing with the requirement that defendant have 
knowledge that the gun was in fact converted into an automatic 
machine gun.l34 The Court reasoned that "[e]ven dangerous items can, 
in some cases, be so commonplace and generally available that we 
would not consider them to alert individuals to the likelihood of strict 
regulation."l35 The Court did not compare guns to pencils, dental floss 
and paper clips.l36 Rather, the Court simply stated that, in the face of 
congressional silence, the Court would not interpret the statute as 
eliminating a mens rea requirement.l37 The Court noted that Congress 
could eliminate mens rea in such a statute if it did so by explicitly 
eliminating the mens rea requirement.l38 
In summary, if a regulated item is inherently dangerous or, in other 
words, an item that one would expect to be regulated, a legislature 
need not state specifically that it intends to remove knowledge of the 
law as an element of the crime.l39 On the other hand, if the regulation 
is not inherently dangerous, thereby one of which the general popu-
lation would be unaware, the legislature must clearly and explicitly 
state its intention to dispense with knowledge of the law as an ele-
ment of the crime.l40 
134 Id. at 605-06. 
135 Id. at 610-11. The Court stated that "[g]uns in general are not 'deleterious devices or 
products or obnoxious waste materials,' that put their owners on notice that they stand 'in 
responsible relation to a public danger.''' Id. (citations omitted). 
136 See United States v. International Minerals & Chern. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 564 (1971). 
137 Staples, 511 U.S. at 619-20. The Court stated: 
We note only that our holding depends critically on our view that if Congress had 
intended to make outlaws of gun owners who were wholly ignorant of the offending 
characteristics of their weapons, and to subject them to lengthy prison terms, it would 
have spoken more clearly to that effect. 
Id. at 620. 
138 Id. at 615 n.ll; cf United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 251-52 (1922) (stating that mens 
rea not necessary where purpose of statute would be obstructed). 
139 See International Minerals, 402 U.S. at 565. 
140 Staples, 511 U.S. at 605-06, 615 n.ll. The Supreme Court described the processes of review 
thus: "[W]e essentially have relied on the nature of the statute and the particular character of 
the items regulated to determine whether congressional silence concerning the mental element 
of the offense should be interpreted as dispensing with conventional mens rea requirements." 
Id. at 607. The Supreme Court has held that statutes requiring willful violations evidence a 
Congressional intention to retain knowledge of the law. See, e.g., Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 
U.S. 135, 146-47 (1994) (holding that Congress' use of the word "willfully," signified that the 
government must prove knowledge of illegality in prosecutions for currency structuring); Cheek 
v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 200-01, 202-04 (1991) (holding good-faith belief that one is not 
violating the law negates willfulness in tax law violation). 
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IV. CRIMINAL PROSECUTION AND THE MIGRATORY BIRD 
TREATY ACT 
The two United States circuit court opinions of United States v. 
Wulff41 and United States v. Engler142 explicitly analyze the constitu-
tionality of removing criminal intent from an environmental statute. 
Both cases, although reaching conflicting results, focus on whether 
the United States Constitution requires proof of mens rea-specifically 
knowledge of the law.l43 These cases provide fertile ground for analy-
sis in this area because their differing views have never been ad-
dressed directly by the United States Supreme Court, Congress has 
amended the statute analyzed in these cases, and there have been no 
reported criminal prosecutions since the cases were decided.l44 
On September 15, 1983, a federal grand jury returned a one-count 
indictment charging Robert Wulff with selling migratory bird parts in 
violation of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA).l45 Section 707(b)(2) 
of the MBTA provided as follows: 
(b) Whoever, in violation of this subchapter, shall- ... (2) sell, 
offer for sale, barter or offer to barter, any migratory bird shall 
be guilty of a felony and shall be fined not more than $2,000 or 
imprisoned not more than two years, or both.l46 
Wulff sold a necklace made of red-tailed hawk and great-horned owl 
talons to a special agent of the United States Fish and Wildlife Serv-
ice.147 Both birds were protected species under the MBTA.l48 
141 758 F.2d 1121, 1122 (6th Cir. 1985). 
142 United States v. Engler, 806 F.2d 425, 436 (3d Cir. 1986). 
143 ld. at 433-44; Wulff, 758 F.2d at 1125. These cases implicitly deal with the idea that if a 
criminal penalty is sought, all of the constitutional protections are required as a part of the 
proceeding. See Engler, 806 F.2d at 436; Wulff, 758 F.2d at 1125. Cf, Kennedy v. Mendoza-
Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 167-69 (1963). 
144 See Mandiberg, supra note 4, at 1176. 
145 Wulff, 758 F.2d at 1122. 
146 16 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2) (1976) (current version at 16 U.S.C. § 707(b) (1994». Any other 
violation was a misdemeanor with a maximum sentence of six months in prison and a $500 fine. 
ld. § 707(a). The MBTA prohibits a broad range of activities affecting migratory birds. The Act 
sets out prohibited activities in §§ 703 and 705. 16 U.S.C. §§ 703, 705 (1994). Both sections 
pertain to birds, their parts, nests, and eggs that are included in certain conventions between 
the United States and other countries. ld. Section 703 prohibits individuals from capturing, 
killing, possessing, and exchanging protected birds or their parts. ld. § 703. Section 705 prohibits 
individuals from shipping, transporting, or importing birds when capturing, killing, or trans-
porting them is unlawful in their country of origin. ld. § 705. The Act does permit the National 
Fish & Wildlife Service to grant permits for some of these activities. ld. § 712. 
147 WUlff, 758 F.2d at 1122. 
148 ld. 
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On appeal the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 
held that the court could not read a scienter requirement into § 707(b) 
because "the crime is not one known to the common law."149 The Sixth 
Circuit dismissed the government's arguments that Congress intended 
to omit a requirement of mens rea, stating that Congress probably 
omitted to require proof of scienter "due to oversight."150 Most impor-
tantly, the court, relying on Morissette v. United States,l51 held that 
the absence of mens rea denied defendant his due process rights 
under the Fifth Amendment because the crime was not known to 
common law and because the felony penalty provision was severe and 
would result in irreparable damage to one's reputation.152 The court 
stated that $2,000 was not a small penalty and that a felony conviction 
irreparably damages one's reputation, resulting in a loss in civil rights.l53 
The court stated: 
We are of the opinion that in order for one to be convicted of a 
felony under the MBTA ... Congress must require the prosecu-
tion to prove the defendant acted with some degree of scienter. 
Otherwise, a person acting with a completely innocent state of 
mind could be subjected to a severe penalty and grave damage to 
his reputation. This, in our opinion, the Constitution does not 
allow. 154 
One year later the United States Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit in a strikingly similar case held that the felony provision of 
the MBTA did not violate due process.155 In September 1982 an un-
dercover agent for the United States Fish and Wildlife Service met 
with Edward Engler at a "trapper's rendezvous" in Pennsylvania.156 
149 [d. at 1124 (citing Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 252, 262 (1951». 
150 [d. at 1124 n.1. 
151 See Morissette, 342 U.S. at 260-62 (1951). 
152 WUlff, 758 F.2d at 1125. The Sixth Circuit based this holding on Justice Blackmun's opinion 
as a Judge on the Eighth Circuit in Holdridge v. United States, 282 F.2d 302, 310 (8th Cir. 1960). 
[d. Justice Blackmun wrote: 
[Wlhere a federal criminal statute omits mention of intent and where it seems to 
involve what is basically a matter of policy, where the standard imposed is, under the 
circumstances, reasonable and adherence thereto properly expected of a person, where 
the penalty is relatively small, where conviction does not gravely besmirch, where the 
statutory crime is not one taken over from the common law, and where congressional 
purpose is supporting, the statute can be construed as one not requiring criminal 
intent. The elimination of this element is then not violative of the due process clause. 
Holdridge, 282 F.2d at 310. 
153 Wulff; 758 F.2d at 1125. 
154 [d. 
155 United States v. Engler, 806 F.2d 425, 436 (3d Cir. 1986). 
156 [d. at 427. 
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The agent claimed to be a dealer in animal parts, such as bear claws 
and raccoon tails, and discussed the possibility of purchasing animal 
parts from Engler. Over the next several months, the agent and other 
Fish and Wildlife agents purchased animal and bird parts from Engler. 
Between May 15, 1983, and January 16, 1985, Engler sold the agents 
birds or bird parts that were protected under the MBTA.l57 
The Third Circuit held that the MBTA criminal penalties did not 
violate due process because "due process is not violated by the impo-
sition of strict liability as part of 'a regulatory measure in the interest 
of public safety, which may well be premised on the theory that one 
would hardly be surprised to learn that [the prohibited conduct] is not 
an innocent act."'l58 The court stated that the MBTA clearly fell "within 
the continuum of strict liability crimes discussed in Freed."l59 The 
court stated: "The capture and sale of species protected by the MBTA 
is not 'conduct that is wholly passive,' but more closely resembles 
conduct 'that one would hardly be surprised to learn ... is not inno-
cent.' The prohibition of such sales furthers 'a national interest of very 
nearly the first magnitude."'l60 The court also held that a $2,000 fine 
was relatively small and that a felony conviction did not "unconstitu-
tionally tarnish" the accused's reputation.l6l 
157 [d. 
158 [d. at 435 (quoting United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 609 (1971». The Third Circuit, 
however, did state: "[sJtrict liability for omissions which are not 'per se blameworthy' may 
violate due process .... " [d. (quoting Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 228 (1957». 
159 [d. at 432. See supra notes 119-23 and accompanying text for discussion of Freed v. United 
States. 
160 Engler, 806 F.2d at 435-36 (quoting Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 435 (1920». 
161 [d. at 434. The court specifically noted that "[tJhe Supreme Court and the Fifth and Seventh 
Circuits have affirmed the constitutionality of strict liability crimes with equivalent or greater 
penalties." [d. at 435. The court provided the following examples: 
[d. 
United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601 (1971) (possession of unregistered firearm; fines 
up to $10,000 and/or imprisonment up to ten years); Williams v. North Carolina, 325 
U.S. 226 (1945) (bigamous cohabitation; up to ten years imprisonment); United States 
v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943) (shipment of misbranded or adulterated drugs; fines 
up to $1,000 and/or imprisonment up to one year for first offense, $10,000 and/or three 
years for subsequent offense); United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922) (unlawful 
drug sale; imprisonment up to five years); Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota, 218 U.S. 
57 (1910) (cutting timber on state land; fines up to $1,000 and/or imprisonment up to 
two years); Stepniewski v. Gagnon, 732 F.2d 567 (7th Cir. 1984) (home improvement 
trade practices violations; fines up to $5,000 and/or imprisonment up to one year); 
United States v. Ayo-Gonzalez, 536 F.2d 652 (5th Cir. 1976) (fishing in United States 
contiguous fishing zone; fines up to $100,000 and/or imprisonment up to one year), cert. 
denied, 429 U.S. 1072 (1977). 
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The Third Circuit specifically disagreed with the Sixth Circuit's 
decision in Wulff that when adding the felony provision to the MBTA 
"[i]t is quite likely that Congress omitted to require proof of scienter 
due to oversight."162 The Third Circuit stated that the legislative 
history suggested that the statutory schema of the MBTA presented 
"two factual scenarios for imposing strict liability on those who hunt 
migratory birds-if the actor hunts for pleasure, it is a misdemeanor; 
if for commercial purposes, it is a felony."163 
Judge Higginbotham of the Third Circuit concurred in the result 
but disagreed with the majority on the level of mens rea required to 
avoid due process concerns.164 First, he suggested that because the 
evidence demonstrated that the defendant did indeed possess scien-
ter, the constitutionality of the MBTA need not be considered.165 Sec-
ond, he disagreed with the majority's determination that a violation 
of the MBTA is a public welfare offense. He stated: 
Because I believe that there are serious, tangible, collateral con-
sequences that attach to one's reputation as a convicted felon, I 
would require at least a minimal showing of intent before an 
accused is convicted under § 707(b)(2), which, I believe, proscribes 
neither a "public welfare offense" nor conduct that the ordinary 
citizen would recognize as wrong.166 
In response to these conflicting opinions, Congress amended § 707(b) 
of the MBTA in an effort to resolve the difference of opinions.167 
Congress changed the language to require a knowing violation: 
Whoever, in violation of this subchapter, shall knowingly-
(1) take by any manner whatsoever any migratory bird with 
intent to sell, offer to sell, barter or offer to barter such bird, or 
(2) sell, offer for sale, barter or offer to barter, any migratory 
bird shall be guilty of a felony and shall be fined no more than 
$2,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.168 
162 [d. at 432 n.3 (quoting United States v. Wulff, 758 F.2d 1121, 1124 n.l (6th Cir. 1985)). 
163 [d. at 431. 
164 [d. at 436. 
165 Engler, 806 F.2d at 438--39 (Higginbotham, Jr., J., concurring). 
166 [d. at 439 (Higginbotham, Jr., J., concurring). 
167 See Emergency Wetlands Resources Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99~45, 100 Stat. 3582 
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 707(b) 1994)). The legislative history of the amendment 
indicates that Congress intended the amendment to cure the problems raised by the Wulff and 
Engler decisions. See S. REP. No. 445, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1986), reprinted in 1986 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6113, 6128. 
168 16 U.S.C. § 707(b) (emphasis added). 
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Interestingly, the Senate report states that proof is not required that 
the defendant know the taking, sale, barter or offer is in violation of 
the MBTA or that the bird is listed in the Act.169 Thus, the addition of 
the word "knowingly" does not resolve the fundamental differences 
in the circuit court opinions. The language appears to require the 
same form of strict liability that WUlff defined as a violation of due 
process.170 
Both the Engler and WUlff courts misunderstood the scope of the 
inquiry facing them.l7l The first and main issue that should have been 
before the courts was what Congress intended the "knowing" require-
ment to represent.172 Because the meaning was unclear, the courts 
could have interpreted the statutes to avoid constitutional questions.l73 
If the Sixth Circuit had limited its focus in this manner, the court could 
have held that the MBTA required knowledge of the law without 
determining if removing a vicious will in such a statute violates due 
process. For example, the Sixth Circuit could have found that the 
MBTA's regulations of taking or selling migratory birds or their parts 
is a regulation of which the general population is unaware.174 If the 
court had done this, the court would not have needed to tackle the 
constitutional question of whether the regulation violated due proc-
ess.175 Because there was no expectation in the public to have such 
items regulated and because the statute and legislative history were 
unclear as to the intent of Congress, the Sixth Circuit could have 
decided to read in a scienter requirement as the United States Su-
169 S. REP. No. 445. The legislative history states that "[ilt is not intended that proof be 
required that the defendant knew the taking, sale, barter, or offer was a violation of the 
subchapter, nor that he know the particular bird was listed in the various international treaties 
implemented by this Act." Id. 
170 See United States v. Wulff, 758 F.2d 1121, 1125 (6th Cir. 1985). 
171 The court in WUlff incorrectly assumed that the question for the court was "whether the 
absence of a requirement that the government prove some degree of scienter violates the 
defendant's right to due process." Id. at 1125. 
172 See, e.g., Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 605, 614 (1994); Liparota v. United States, 
471 U.S. 419, 430 (1984). 
173 See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 348 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concur-
ring) (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932» (stating that it is a "'cardinal principle'" 
of statutory construction to '''first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly 
possible by which [a constitutional] question may be avoided."'); see also Edward J. DeBartolo 
Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988); NLRB v. 
Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 499-501, 504 (1979); Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 
148 (1927) (Holmes, J., concurring). 
174 See Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 229-30 (1957); Morissette v. United States, 342 
U.S. 246, 262 (1951). 
175 See United States v. International Minerals & Chern. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 564 (1971). 
1997] CRIMINAL PROSECUTION 619 
preme Court did in Morissette v. United States.176 In the face of uncer-
tainty as to Congressional intent, the court could have cited Liparota 
v. United States for the proposition that "'far more than the simple 
omission of the appropriate phrase from the statutory definition is 
necessary to justify dispensing with an intent requirement,' and ... 
criminal offenses requiring no mens rea have a 'generally disfavored 
status."'177 
Similarly, the Third Circuit in Engler could have avoided a due 
process analysis of dispensing with mens rea in the MBTA. In Engler 
the "indictment charged Engler with 'knowingly' violating the statute 
and the court charged the jury accordingly."178 In the concurring opinion 
Judge Higginbotham noted: "if the evidence in fact established 'knowl-
edge,' as the government contends, all that due process requires was 
met in this case. We need not reach the question whether as a matter 
of constitutional law scienter is a required element of a felony offense 
under the MBTA."179 Nevertheless, the Sixth Circuit found that the 
MBTA was a regulatory measure similar to those in United States v. 
Freed and United States v. Dotterweich which regulated in the inter-
est of the public safety.18o By analogy the court could have found that 
the MBTA was in the class of regulatory measures which the Supreme 
Court specifically had stated did not require proof of a vicious will.18I 
Both courts, apparently drawing on language in Morissette,182 also 
considered the severity of the MBTA's criminal penalties as disposi-
tive constitutional factors.l83 The Sixth Circuit, holding that the MBTA 
penalty violated due process, reasoned that the Constitution would 
not allow a person to be subjected to a penalty of $2,000 and the 
176 The Sixth Circuit did not do this because it incorrectly interpreted Morissette as holding 
that a court could read in a scienter requirement "only where the crime is one borrowed from 
the common law." Wulff, 758 F.2d at 1124 (emphasis added); see also notes 91-99 and accompa-
nying text for discussion of Supreme Court's holding in Morissette. 
177 Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 426 (1984) (quoting United States v. United States 
Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 438 (1978)). 
178 United States v. Engler, 806 F.2d 425, 437 (3d Cir. 1986) (Higginbotham, Jr., J., concurring). 
179 [d. 
180 [d. at 438. 
181 See, e.g., Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 605 (1994); Liparota, 471 U.S. at 424-25; 
United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 607 (1971). 
182 See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 256 (1951). The Supreme Court in Morissette 
suggested that courts had dispensed with mens rea in public welfare offenses because the 
penalties were commonly relatively small and no grave damage occurred to an offenders 
reputation. [d. The Court in Engler interpreted the reasoning in Morissette as establishing a 
due process limit on dispensing with specific intent. Engler, 806 F.2d at 432-33. 
183 See Engler, 806 F.2d at 434-35; United States v. Wulff, 758 F.2d 1121, 1125 (6th Cir. 1985). 
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resulting damage to his reputation without criminal intent.184 Con-
versely, the Third Circuit, finding that the MBTA penalty did not 
violate due process, reasoned that the penalty did not ''unconstitu-
tionally tarnish" the accused's reputation.185 Both courts improperly 
interpreted the meaning of Morissette. Morissette stands for the sim-
ple proposition that mere omission of criminal intent, especially in 
crimes similar to those at common law, will not be construed as elimi-
nating that element from the crime.186 The Supreme Court did not 
intend to delineate constitutional requirements for mens rea.187 If 
anything, the reference to the severity of criminal penalties in Moris-
sette indicates that where statutes and legislative history fail to define 
the mens rea of a particular offense, courts may consider the severity 
of penalties in determining the intent of Congress.188 Hence, the Engler 
and Wulff courts should have looked to the severity of the penalties 
only as an indication of congressional intent.189 
Although there have been no felony prosecutions under the MBTA 
since its amendment,190 it seems clear that due process would not 
require proof of a vicious will under the amended MBTA. First, the 
MBTA is dissimilar to the statutes at issue in Morissette, Freed, 
Liparota, and StapZes.191 The statutes at issue in those cases did not 
dispense specifically with knowledge of the law and the legislative 
history was either unclear or silent on the issue.192 Although the 
MBTA does not require or eliminate specifically a vicious will, the 
legislative record clearly indicates that Congress intended to dispense 
with the requirement of a vicious will.193 Thus, in a future felony 
184 Wulff, 758 F.2d at 1125. 
185 Engler, 806 F.2d at 434. 
186 Morissette, 342 U.S. at 263. 
187 [d. at 260. The Court stated: 
[d. 
Neither this Court nor, so far as we are aware, any other has undertaken to delineate 
a precise line or set forth comprehensive criteria for distinguishing between crimes 
that require a mental element and crimes that do not. We attempt no closed definition, 
for the law on the subject is neither settled nor static. 
188 See id. at 263. 
189 See id. at 261--63. 
190 Mandiberg, supra note 3, at 1176. 
191 Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 605 (1994); Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 
424-25 (1985); United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 607 (1971); Morissette, 342 U.S. at 261--62. 
192 See Staples, 511 U.S. at 605 (stating Congress omitted express prescription of criminal 
intent); Liparota, 471 U.S. at 424-25 (same); Morissette, 342 U.S. at 261--62 (same); see also 
Freed, 401 U.S. at 607 (stating that Act requires no specific intent or knowledge). 
193 See supra notes 167--69 and accompanying text. 
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prosecution under the MBTA and in light of the legislative history, a 
court would not be interpreting whether the word "knowingly" con-
tained an element of a vicious will.194 Rather, the court would be faced 
with the question of whether Congress may so dispense with a vicious 
will without violating due process. 
The dispositive issue then becomes whether the MBTA regulates 
wholly innocent behavior or items akin to "[p]encils, dental floss, [and] 
paper clips."195 The MBTA, which prohibits individuals from captur-
ing, killing, possessing, and exchanging protected birds or their parts,196 
appears on its face to regulate behavior and items which the general 
public should be aware are regulated.197 The United States Supreme 
Court has long held that government may regulate the public prop-
erty rights in wildlife.198 Today most people should be aware of laws 
regulating wildlife. Every state has regulations regarding its wild-
life,199 as does the federal government.2OO In 1990 seven percent of the 
American population bought hunting licenses, spending millions in the 
process.201 In light of the large amount of existing wildlife regulation, 
all Americans should have fair warning that capturing, killing, pos-
sessing, or exchanging animals and their parts is regulated activity. 
Hence, equating the MBTA with the regulation of papers clips seems 
194 The legislative history to the MBTA seems be clear. See S. REP. No. 445, 99th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 16 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6113, 6128. If the MBTA required extremely 
severe penalties, however, the Supreme Court could find that mention of the required mens rea 
in legislative materials rather than the statute itself is not a sufficiently clear indication of 
legislative intent. The Court could require greater specificity as penalties become more severe. 
195 See United States v. International Minerals & Chern. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 564 (1971). 
196 16 U.S.C. § 703 (1994). 
197 See generally Congressman Toby Roth & Stephen S. Boynton, Some Reflection on the 
Development of National Wildlife Law and Policy and the Consumptive Use of Renewable 
Wildlife Resources, 77 MARQ. L. REV. 71, 72 (1993) (discussing wildlife regulation in the United 
States). 
198 See Greer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 528-29 (1896) (stating that states have power "to 
control and regulate the common property in game ... as a trust for the benefit of the people"); 
see also Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 345, 349 (1842) (finding that King held dominion 
and property in navigable waters as public trust). 
199 See, e.g., CoLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-4-102(1) (West 1994) (Division of Wildlife can issue 
licenses and collect fees); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 102(c) (1991) (Department of Natural 
Resources and Environmental Control must prescribe the form of licenses and collect fees); N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 23:3-1a (West 1994) (Fish and Game Council can determine hunting license fees). 
See generally RUTH S. MUSTGRAVE & MARY ANNE STEIN, STATE WILDLIFE LAWS HANDBOOK 
(1993). 
200 See, e.g., Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-43 (1994); Lacey Act, Ch. 553, 31 Stat. 
187 (1900) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 701, 3371-3378 (1994) and 18 U.S.C. § 42 (1994». 
201 Michael Satchell, The American Hunter Under Fire, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 5, 
1990, at 30. 
622 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 24:595 
illogical. Although the MBTA may not fall into the inherently danger-
ous class of regulations, such as those involving acid and grenades, it 
seems likely that the Supreme Court would find the MBTA similar to 
the regulation of automatic guns and food stamps. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Prosecutors should not fear a constitutional challenge to criminal 
prosecution of violators of the MBTA. Congress has indicated clearly 
that criminal intent is not required for a violation of the MBTA. 
Further, there is little, if any, merit to a contention that the MBTA 
violates due process because it criminalizes wholly innocent behavior. 
The Supreme Court is unlikely to infringe upon the legislature's abil-
ity to eliminate criminal intent in the MBTA, as well as other envi-
ronmental regulations, so long as the legislature specifically eliminates 
criminal intent and has not criminalized totally innocent behavior. The 
due process requirement of fair warning demands very little from 
legislatures when they define criminal acts. Whatever the wisdom in 
criminalizing the violation of environmental regulations without proof 
of a vicious will, the Constitution appears to give that discretion to 
legislatures. 
